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Abstrac-t- Transition from lpv4 to lpv6 has been made
possible through various transition mechanisms, categorized as
dual-staclg tunneling and translation. Ilorvever, feriod oftransition may take years to complete which both prolocols will
coexist due to Internet services deployed are widelyin lpv4. Sq a
successful IPv6 transition is depended on the compatibility with
the large installed base of IPv4 hosts and routers. as well as
maintaining security of the network from potential threats and
vulnerabilities of both Internet protocols. This paper classifies
potential security issues in the transltion period and identifies
prevention mechanlsms to the problems identified. As dual-
stacked host or network is the moat simple lpv6 deployment any
enterprise can settle for now, this paper focuseJ on possibli
implementation of distributed firewall in a dual-stacked
environment which involves packet liltering at the edge router as
well as the host-based firewall
Ind* Term.*IPv6 Transition, Dual stack, Tunneling,
Security Mechanismg Distributed Firewalls.
I. lurRooucrroN
TfilS paper provides an insight on secwity considerationsf during the tansition fiom lpv4 to tpv6. Transition to lpv6
will not occur in short time due to wide spread usage of Ipv4
networks since it has beeir intoduced more than 25 years ago.
For the mean time we will settle for interoperability between
IPv4 and IFv6 where both protocols will coexist and support
the present Internet requiranents. Since the two protocols are
used in parallel, appropriate security measures must be
installed to secure the network while fiansition from lpv4 to
IPv6 is in progress. Basically, transition mechanisms [l] are
categorized as dual-stack, tunneling and fanslation. Though,
the most basic transition mechanisms [2] are dual-stacked and
manually configured tunneling of Ipv6 over Ipv4. These two
mechanisms are wise options for initial lpv6 deployment due
to their simple management and less security considerations
[2],[3],[5]. Nevertheless, translation is still important when
communicating between IPv6 and legacy lpv4. This paper
will not cover security aspects of translation mechanisrn- as
they are not in our scope ofresearch.
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Since present Int€rnet services deployed are widely in
IPv4, a successful IPv6 transition is depended on the
compatibility with the large installed base of IPv4 hosts and
routers, as well as maintaining security of the network from
potential threats and wlnerabilities of both lnternet Protocols.
A dual stack device must ernploy adequate host security
mechanisms as its applications can be subject to attack on both
IPv4 and IPv6. So as tmneling, in which packets that enter the
network through a hmnel cannot circurnvent filters and
infroduce potential threats to the network.
The present security mechanisms are not well built to
support IPv6. Many firewalls have separate rule-sets for lpv6
and IPv4 which need to be coordinated and consistent to be
properly managed to avoid an inadvertent security exposure as
well as intentional afiack- Meanwhile, Intrusior Detection
Systan (IDS) has lack of tPv6 sigrratrne database to perform
effectively. This paper classifies potential security issues in
the tansition perid and identifies preventior mechanisms to
the problons identified. Basically, the severity of these issues
related to the complexity of the fansition mechanisrns chose,lr
and failure to apply appropriate mitigation techniques.
Among mitigatior techniques that can be considered for
IPv6 are firewalls, IPsec, auditing and intrusion detection
which are also available in IPv4. However, due to some
crit€ria [3], such as longer address size, different head€r
format between IPv6 and IPv4 and the use of extension
headers in IPv6 we have yet to see the implementation of
security mechanisms specially designed for IPv6. Although
IPsec is mandated in every implernentation of IPv6, due to
bootstrapping problem, it is not always a valid security option.
On the other hand, firewalls [10] have been available for use,
and works on making better of firewalls have been carried out.
As dual-stacked host or network is the most simple lpv6
deploymant any anterprise can settle for now, this paper
focuses on possible implernentation of distributed firewalls
I l] in a dual-stacked environment which involves packet
filtering at the edge router as well as the host-based firewall.
This paper is oreanized as follows: We begin with a
description of potential security issues in the tansition period
and their respective countermeasures. This is followed with
review of some prevention mechmisms to counter the
highlighted issues. Then we discuss the design of the
distibuted firewalls and the possibility of proble,ms related to
it. Finally, we sum up with the conclusion and futrne work.
II. SECUNTTY ISSUES AND PREVENTING MECHANISMS
Prior to migration or co-existence with IPv6, an
understanding of its security implication is necessary to avoid
worries or un-acceptance among users or decision makers. We
need to prepare the network users against the possible threats
or attacks that may affect the network and its resources. Prior
to that, we need a better understanding in order to come up
with a comprehansive and enforceable security policy for the
network. Security issues in the IPv6 transition/co-existence
[4] can be viewed in terms of issues due to the IPv6 protocol
itself issues due to transition mechanisms and issues due to
the IPv6 deployment.
A. Issues due to IPv6 Protocol
Followed to significant differences between features in
IPv4 and IPv6, some of those specification changes may result
in potential security issues. Overall, security issues due to the
specific IPv6 protocol and their respective countermeasures
can be simplified into a diagram as depicted in Fig 1. The left
side boxes represent list of security mechanisms to counter the
problems in the right boxes which they are pointed to. As
mentioned in [6], DoS is the leading threat or key attack to
the Internet. Compare to IPv4, DoS in IPv6 quite similar in
which it is resulted from various security wlnerabilities and
threats of the IPv6 protocol. The dim line to the right of the
diagram indicates all threats and wlnerabilities that would
have high potential in generating DoS attacks.
In IPv6, reconnaissance attacks may still possible. With a
longer address space and larger subnet size, scanning IPv6
network by intuders would be tougher compared to IPv4.
Though, some q/pes of multicast addresses used in IPv6
network might expose some of its resources to the intuders
(for instance, all routers with a site-specific address FF05::2).
Information of these resources may assist inffuders in
launching directed attacks such as flooding which resulted in
DoS. To counter this scenario, all firewalls and site boundary
routers should be configured to drop packets with site scope
destination address.
Another potential of DoS is misuse of routing headers to
avoid access confiols that is based on destination address. It is
possible because any publicly accessible host can redirect the
attack packets. To prevent this, ingress/egress filtering must
determine whether the source address is right for the
destination and orsuring that routing headers do not contain
the same way point address more than once.
As ICMPv6 plays an imporant role in IPv6, a major
concern should be paid to its related issues. For instance,
ICMh/6 and multicast address in which ICMPv6 allows error
notification responses to be sent wtren certain unprocessable
packets are sent to multicast addresses. A potential attacker
can craft a suitable packet sent to a multicast destination, it
may draw multiple responses directed at the victim (the
spoofed source of the multicast packet).
Bogus errued packets in ICMPv6 Enor Messages are also
part of main issues. Bogus ICMhd Error Messages (type 0 to
127) containing a spoofed errored packet which can impact
higher layer protocols when the alleged errored packet is
referred to the higher layer at the destination of the ICMPv6
packet. This can be countered by inspecting the alleged
errored packet embedded in the ICMPv6 error message via
firewall. Firewalls and destination hosts should be suspicious
of ICMPv6 error messages with unnecessarily tnmcated
errored packets. Details on how to address the ICMPv6 issues
can be refened in [7].
Neighbor Discovery (ND) has so many issues that can be
addressed in its own ND protocol. It has a close relationship
with router discovery (RD) and many vulnerabilities regarding
ND and RD are addressed in Neighbor Discovery Protocol
(NDP). Both securing router and neighbor discovery can be
done through Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND) t8l.
Another related issue is link local ad&ess and SeND in which
potantiality of abuse at the tunnel end-points. For tunnel end-
points, filtering has to be provided by a host-based or b'ridging
firewall.
Countermeasures Secudty lssues
Intrusion Detection
Syetem (lDS)
Fig. 1. Security issues and the respective count€rmeasures.
Fragmantation related attack is also part of IPv6 specific
issue in which packets with overlapping fiagments are
considered to be a major security risk. Packets reassembly in
IPv6 hosts 
- 
may result in DoS aftack based on sending large
number of small fragments without a terminating last
fragment. In crder to ensure that deep packet inspection can be
carried out correctly on fragmented packets, many firewalls
and other nodes that use deep packet inspection will collect
the fragments and reassemble the packet before examining the
Denial of Service
(Dos)
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packet. To mitigate this scenario, firewalls must forbid
overlapping packet fragments.
Security issues regarding Extansion Headers are related to
processing Extension Headers in middleboxes, processing
Extension Headers chains, unknown headers or destination
options, excessive hopby-hop options, misues of padl and
PadN options and overuse router alert options. These issues
are mostly due to ambiguity or incomplete specification in the
base IPv6 specification. Security mechanisms needed here will
be depending on the specific issues that require attention and
most of thern are related to configrning a respective firewall.
B. Issues due to Transition Mechqnisms
The more complex the mechanism, the greater ttre danger
introduced. The tlrreats could be encountered in the
mechanisms themselves, in the interaction between
mechanisms or by intoducing unsecured path through
multiple mechanisms. So, in depth understanding of the
security implications of the transition mechanism may help
network security administators to apply suitable security
mechanisms in ttreir network. We me concern only with dual
stack and fimneling.
As for dual stack, a device must employ adequate host
security mechanisms as its applications can be subject to
attack on both IPv4 and lpv6. Thoefore, any host contols
such as firewalls, VPN clients and IDSs must be able to
inspect fraffic from both Ip versions and block specific traffrc
when a block is nec€ssary. What the network a&ninisfator
should consider here is to extend the firewall with tpv6
support and corresponding rule sets for tpv6 or implunent
sspaxate tPv6-only firewall which can s@ure the hosts and
network as the sixne way its Ipv4 counterpart does. In
addition, appropriate IPv6 access control lists (ACLs) must
also crafted and placed accordingly which are capable to
implernent the same restictions as Ipv4's ACLs .
As for hmneling, mechanism that we can simply settle for
at the beginning of IPv6 deployment is a Tunnel Broker.
However, it becomes an issue if site a&ninistrator totaly
unaware of users on their site who use tunnel brrokers. Without
any guidelines or site requisite for .!roper" Ipv6 deployment
may infroduce security holes which the adrninistator does not
know about and therefore does not guard against.
For configured tunneling, concerns lie at a host behind
IPv4 firewall when it needs to op€n firewall for protocol 4l(IPv6) and in some cases also for protocol 5g (ICMFv6) at
least for the host at the remote end ofthe tunnel, which will be
the source of the incoming lpv4 traffic that contains the IFv4
packets. Since there is no particular tlpe of authentication
mechanism for tunnels was defined, packet verification is
done by checking on the Ipv4 packet's souroe address. As a
resulf exploitation such as Ip spoofing, injecting packet at the
tunnel endpoint, and blpassing firewall or avoiding ingress
filtering checks [4] become major threats in trmniting
mechanism. PJC489I [9] may help us in defining methodi
to secwe IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnels.
Certain tunneling mechanisms establish communication
with native IPv6 nodes or between the automatic tunneling
mechanisms via the use of relay. They are 6td ( encapsulate
the IPv6 packet directly in an IPv4 packet) and Toredo
(encapsulate the IPv6 packet directly in an Ipv4 UDp packet).
These relays could be deployed in various location such as all
native IPv6 nodes, native IPv6 sites, in lPv6-enabled ISps orjust somewhere in the Internet. These relays provide a
potential vehicle for address spoofing DoS and other threats.
Automatic tunneling mechanisms [3] such as 6t&, Toredo
and ISATAP are less secure compared to configured
tunneling. They are susceptible to packet forgery and DoS
attacks as there is no preconfigured association between
endpoints. Moreover, receiving nodes must allow
decapsulation of traffic sourced from anywhere in the
lnternet. Thus, a decapsulation function must be extrernely
well secured to deal with the wide range of the potential
sources. When deploying automatic turneling users must be
warned of the possible consequences and prop€r guidelines
should be underlined so as not to compromise the security
assumptions held by the users.
To deal with tansition security, the network architectrne
must provide separate IPv4 and IPv6 firewalls with tunneled
IPv6 traffic arriving encapsulated in lpv4 packets routed
through the IPv4 firewall before being decapsulated and then
through ttre IPv6 firewall as depicted mFig.2.
Native 1to6
firerr€ll
Native 1tu4
fitqruall
Fig 2. Separate IPv4 and Ipv6 firewalls
C. Issues due to IPv6 Deployment
If possible we would like to have all electronic devices
manufactured to be IPv6 capable. If that is so, with Ipsec
ready we do not have to worry much on the security
implication when deploying IPv6. However, the lack of
equipments or tools such as IPv6 IDS and firewalls may leave
the hosts and routers unprotected. Hence, it would create a
problem if the IPv6 capabilities are turned on by default in
new equipment or new release of operating system without the
network administators realized of the potential security
exposure they may end up with. Sq we need to continue
testing and explcning the IPsec key management issues, Ipv6
firewalls and IPv6 IDS in order to find the possible solutions .
Other issues include DNS server problem, addressing
scheme and securing routers, and consequences of multiple
addresses in IPv6 [4] which require proper observation to deal
with them.
Meanwhile, many IPv6 implementations are quite new and
there are inadequate IFv6 assessment tools [3] available to
audit our own network. In additior, untested codes in lpv6
implementation may also contribute to security flaws which
exposed the network to security threats and attacks.
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D. Prevention Mechanisms Review
Among the prevention mechanisms available are fi,rewalls,
IPsec and Intusion Detection System (IDS).
Firewalls are widely deployed in most organization
connected to the Internet. Based on set of rules or security
policy, firewalls act as a sentry to the network which
determines whether particular packet or sfream of packets can
pass through them or not. The common firewall
implementation is setting it as perimeter firewall because it is
believed that intruders always come from outside while in
reality, the greater eflect of security breach or harmful attacks
are mostly come from the insiders. So, effort to reduce the
risks should include deploymart of multiple firewalls that are
capable of filtering tPv4 and IPv6 packets at the edge router
(perimeter firewall) as well as at the hosts (personal fuewalls).
In choosing appropriate firewall technologies [10] for
particular scenario, network secrnity personnel can consider
options depicted in Fig. 3 .
Fig. 3. Firewall Technologies
In real implementation, hyb'rid firewalls may be used in
which the features of both t)?es of firewalls are combined'
Among IPv6 firewalls available are open source-based such as
Packet Filter from OpenBSD or FreeBSD and Linux p6tables'
Basically, firewall must filter internal-use IFv6 addresses
like site-local addresses and specific multicast addresses at the
edge router in order to safeguard from mis-configurations and
rogue devices. Then, filter ingress/egress interface to deny
spoofed traffic with the host portion of the IPv6 address. Same
goes with unneeded services, they must be unreachable at the
edge firewall to reduce any additional exploits. Denied traffrc
should be logged as they may notiff of a potential malicious
intrusion.
IPsec provides security to end-to-end commrmications at
the network layer. The security features include access
control, connectionless integrity, data origin authentication,
protection against replay attacks, confidentiality, and limited
traffic flow confidantiality. IPsec uses the Internet Key
Exchange (IKE) protocol to handle negotiation of protocols
and algorittrms based on local policy, and to generate the
encryption and authentication kels to be used. Compared to
IPv4 which had to retrofit IPsec headers into the original IPv4
frame,IPv6 supports IPsec within rhe defined packet struchre
using extension headers. However, usage of lPsec resulted in
new problem for network administrators and decrease the
effectiveness of perimeter firewalls because of the inuease
prevalence of encrypted packets on which the firewalls
cannot perform deep packet inspection and filtering.
Bootstrapping problem in lPsec has caused cryptographic
protections become unpopular in many IPv6 deployment.
Nevertheless, a successful IPsec deployment will only affect
the network layer and does nothing to the most common
attacks which targeting the application layer.
Logging and auditing of data traffic are important to detect
or analyze successful security violations. We should log
routing protocol state changes, all router events, all devices
access, all commands iszued to the device and all
configuration changes. Traffic auditing is possible via IDS
system. IDS can be in the form of hardware or software
systan for supervision and analysis of different events
occurring in the network or on the particulm host. The purpose
of IDS is to find potential security problems and to detect an
authorized intrusion and rnisuse of network resources.
Problem with IDS is lack of IFv6 signature database because
pattern based mechanism used for IPv4 may not be
appropriate anymore. Both IFv6 Netwok-Based IDS and Host-
Based IDS need to be available in order to deal with the IPv6
deployment. Work done in U2l to come up with IFv6IDS has
shown a promising result but more study on IDS is needed to
face the ctrallenges in the IPv6 deployment.
In order to have defense in depth, mechanisn like
disfiibuted fuewalls (Fig.a.) would be a good choice.
Fig. 4. Distributed firewalls
III. DISTRIBUTED FIREWALLS
Disfiibuted firewalls may consist of managed host-based
IPv6 firewalls on top of the conventional perimeter firewall.
This involves a combination of centralized security policy
which confiols the edge router as well as individual hosts in
the network.
Three ideas ttrat forming a distributed firewalls [l l] are: a
policy language, any number of system management tools and
IPsec. So, a compiler tanslates the policy language into some
internal format which then be distibuted by the system-
managanent software to all host protected by fuewall.
Incoming packets are granted or denied by each host
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Proxy firewalls - use
rules that check packet
headers and the
content ofthe payload
Stateful fltering 
-
checks the initial
packet header and
other packets for
packet sequence
number consistencY
Regular packet ftlters
-checkthe headerof
every packet
depending on both the policy and the lpsec verified identity of
each sender. Policy is enforced by each individual host that
participates in a distributed firewall. The security administer
defines the securify policy in terms of host identifiers. This
policy is then consulted before processing incoming or
outgoing messages. The local host would have a much
stronger assurance of its identity if peer host is identified by a
certificate.
By having end-to-end Ipsec, each incoming packet can be
associated with a certificate. The rights assigned to the
certificate will determine the access of the associated packet.
So, any packet with different certificate name or without Ipsec
protection, will be dropped as illegal. Implementation of
certificate version is also necessary to protect against new,
insecure machines that are installed on an inside network.
Certificate will not be issued until the appropriate filtering
software and rulesets are installed. This means the machine ii
assumed an outside machine although it is physically inside
the network.
Perimet€r firewalls perform a first layer screening to ensure
the packet is valid, arrive from a valid source and then pass
the packet to the destination host. At the destinatior host
firewall, a second layer screening take place where detail
packet inspection is carry on. The inspection will be
incorporating some intelligent lpsec-aware firnction. If the
packet is encrypted and was not examined in detail at the
perimeter firewall, this can be done at the end-host where the
received packet is decrypted first prior to checking the upper
layer protocols. Upon successful, a packet is sent to the
application process. On the other hand, the fail packet will be
rejected by the host fuewall followed with a violation report
sent to its security management system.
Perimeter firewalls responsible for securing the network
from general attacks and the individual nodes or hosts
firewalls responsible for securing itself from node-related
attacks since IPv6 enabled nodes most likely have global
addresses which mean they may be reachable from any other
IFv6 nodes in the Internet. Hence, host can become a selver
and has a end-toend connection with its counterpart
somewhere out there, which then will require distributed
checking and proper authentication or valid certificate. This
will not be a problem as distributed firewalls permit end-to
end encryption.
As shown in Fig. 4, we try to integrate the NIDS and HIDS
together in the implementation of Distributed firewall. for this
to work, distributed firewall need to be equipped with
capability detecting probes and forward them to some central
location for processing and correlation. Challanges or
problems that we foresee is greater susceptibility to lack of
cooperation by users. Nevertheless, distributed firewalls can
reduce the threat of actual attacks by insiders by simply
making it easier to set up smaller group ofusers and limit their
rights to access server based on least ofprivilege rules.
In addition, delegation of filtering tasks to the end hosts
will reduce t}e performance boftleneck. Besides, distributed
firewall is mo're subtle in which it has certain knowledge of
the host intends. Thus, relfng on the host to make the right
decision is more secure. While the significant advantage is
hosts that are not within the topological boundary are also
protected all the time, regardless of whether or not the tunnel
is set up. Meanwhile, packets that are authenticated by lpsec
are granted more privileges while packets from random
Intemet hosts can be rejected. Hance, IPsec provides anti-
spoofing protection.
IV. corqclusroNs
Transition/coexistence of both IPv4 and IPv6 has caused
major security considerations to the network and alarmed us to
be prepared with appropriate security mechanisms. We
highlighted possible security issues in the hansition period and
subsequently discussed the mechanisms to deal with the
issues. Finally we give a brief intoduction to the proposed
defense in depth mechanism that is the use of hybrid model
which combine IFv6 distibuted firewalls and Intrusion
Detection System to secure the transition network. In future
we will observe the effects of the distributed IPv6 firewalls
with some probability to increase the network performance.
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